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Introduction
From 1987 to the present, Taiwanese investment in China has under-gone dramatic changes. As emphasised in this special issue, actors, val-ues, and change are three core elements we constantly reflect upon
in order to analyse the processual changes in Taiwan. In this paper, we aim
to reveal the long-term evolution of cross-Strait economic activities. Actors
who participated in this long-term process (from the end of the 1980s until
now) include Taiwanese business people (Taishangs (1)), and the governments
in both Taipei and Beijing. We argue that Taishangs’ values have changed
during this long-term process. When the Chinese government needed for-
eign investment in the early 1990s, Taiwanese investors were warmly wel-
comed by the Chinese government and were thus content to pursue mainly
economic interests. However, after 2000, with the emergence of domestic
Chinese entrepreneurs and non-Chinese investors in the Chinese markets,
Taishangs had to build closer political ties with Chinese officials in order to
protect their economic interests in China. Some Taishangs even adopted
the strategy of buying media in Taiwan as social assets to strengthen polit-
ical ties with Chinese officials. For example, a Taiwanese technology tycoon,
Cher Wang, the owner of HTC Corporation, which has substantial invest-
ments in China, has gradually taken ownership of Taiwan’s leading cable
channel group, TVBS, since 2011. Likewise, a Taiwanese processed foods con-
glomerate, Ting Hsin Food Group, which developed its business in China in
1990, also attempted to acquire a major cable TV operator in Taiwan in
2014. (2) The Want Want group is a critical case to illustrate the strategy
adopted. This group purchased a cross-media group in Taiwan, (3) which al-
lowed it to serve as a messenger to deliver the pro-Chinese government’s
political ideology in Taiwan. It was therefore able to use Taiwanese media
as an asset to build ties with Chinese officials at the cost of local resistance
from Taiwan. We acknowledge that the Want Want group might be an ex-
treme case in indicating the changing values of Taishangs; however, we take
it as an example of how the dynamic of political economy across the Strait
has caused business interests to become intertwined with the government’s
political goals. 
The Want Want group, which was originally established in Taiwan and
moved its business to China in 1992, later returned to Taiwan to buy Tai-
wan’s main media group. Want Want further attempted to buy a major mul-
tiple system operator (MSO, referring to an operator that owns several cable
systems) in a market where more than 80% of homes watch cable televi-
sion. This merger later resulted in the island’s biggest demonstration against
media monopoly on 1 September 2012.
Want Want’s investment in Taiwan’s media had a different rationale from
that of previous Taiwanese business groups. According to related literature,
previous Taishangs in China mainly followed the economic rationale. They
wanted to maximise profits and reduce costs, so they moved to China and
seldom returned to invest in Taiwan. They focused on their own business
and did not invest in media-related concerns. They maintained good rela-
tions with all parties and did not offend local communities. (4) However,
while Want Want’s headquarters, factories, and revenues remained in
China, (5) the company came back to Taiwan and invested in the media busi-
ness. It should be noted that investing in the media is a costly and risky en-
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1. Taishangs are known as Taiwanese business people; in this paper we use Taishangs to replace Tai-
wanese business people.
2. In 2011, Cher Wang bought a 26% stake in TVB, Hong Kong’s leading free-to-air broadcaster. As
TVB was the parent company of TVBS, a major cable channel family in Taiwan, Wang also became
part-owner of TVBS. In 2016, Wang bought the remaining shares of TVBS at the cost of NT$130
billion. Hsu Yi-Ping, “Cher Wang buys TVBS for 130 billion dollars,” Liberty Times, 20 October 2016,
http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/1046492 (accessed on 2 January 2017).
3. The China Times group include two newspaper titles, one terrestrial television station and a cable
channel family.
4. Chun-Yi Lee, “Between Dependency and Autonomy – Taiwanese Entrepreneurs and Local Chinese
Governments,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs (China aktuell), Vol. 39, No. 1, 2010, pp. 37-71.
5. Want Want China Holdings Limited, “Annual Report, 2015,” 2015, http://www.want-want.net/up-
load/Investor/C16020406.pdf (accessed on 10 May 2016).
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deavour; Want Want paid NT$20.4 billion (around US$680 million) to buy
the China Times media group, and it took almost NT$80 billion (around
US$2.4 billion) to buy the main cable operator. While Taiwan has respected
press freedom since the lifting of martial law in 1987, Want Want used this
media freedom to deliver the pro-Chinese government’s political ideology. (6)
Its chairman, Tsai Eng-Meng (蔡衍明), used the media to attack those he
deemed enemies, including legislative regulators, journalists, and citizen
groups. (7)
Concerning this type of media investor, there are at least two existing ex-
planations, each with specific policy implications. The first explanation is
that Taiwanese capital has recovered media ownership from foreigners. The
Taiwanese government has loosened its regulation over media ownership,
and foreign investors have been allowed to own up to 60% of cable systems
since 2002. Since then, Taiwanese cable systems have mainly been owned
by foreign companies. The owner of the Want Want group often describes
himself as a Taiwanese coming back to boost Taiwan’s economy and to im-
prove cross-Strait relations. (8) From this perspective, Taiwanese regulators
should welcome the company’s return for its ability to reclaim Taiwan’s
cable TV industry from foreign investors (the private companies that have
bought and sold Taiwan’s cable companies), and treat them as Taiwanese
nationals.
The second explanation completely rejects the first, arguing that this type
of capital can be described as “Red capital.” It is argued that Want Want,
although established in Taiwan, has become deeply rooted in China and
transmits a pro-Chinese government political ideology. Some opposition
politicians have pointed out that 93% of Want Want’s revenue was gener-
ated from the Chinese market and that the Want Want group is traded on
the Hong Kong stock market; therefore the Want Want group should be
considered a Chinese industry. (9) According to this interpretation, Taiwanese
regulators should consider Mr. Tsai a Chinese capitalist and should not allow
him to buy Taiwan’s cable systems, because Chinese business people are
not allowed to enter this market according to Taiwanese law.
However, both interpretations fail to explain how this type of media in-
vestment emerged, nor can they fully explain why Want Want voluntarily
provided ideological services to the Chinese government. The debatable
point of these two explanations also lies in the definition of the capital
owner’s nationality. In line with the three main elements of this special
issue, this article asks: what kind of Taiwanese businessmen does Want Want
represent? How did it emerge? What are the main rationales for its prac-
tices? There is no doubt that Taishangs – in our example, the Want Want
group – are the agents of this change. By tracing the process of the Want
Want group’s emergence in Taiwan and its subsequent investment in China,
we aim to identify the changing nature of business’s interaction with gov-
ernment; more specifically, in our case, of Taishangs with the Chinese gov-
ernment.
This paper argues that before 2008, Want Want mainly followed an eco-
nomic logic and expanded in many provinces. However, under Chinese state
capitalism, Want Want needed to build ties with the Chinese central gov-
ernment. When the CCP conducted its “Grand Overseas Propaganda” Cam-
paign in 2008, co-opting Chinese private capitalists to acquire media
abroad, Want Want acquired Taiwanese media and imposed a firm “pro-
China” stance on the media outlets purchased by the group; however, in
doing so it encountered severe local resistance in Taiwan, where 60% of the
population considered themselves Taiwanese (not Chinese), and another
85% wanted either de-jure independence or de-facto independence from
China. (10) The empirical data for this paper come from long-term interviews
with Taishangs in China, including three field trips in 2004-2005, 2008-
2009, and 2014-2016 respectively. In the first two field trips, the intervie-
wees were Taishangs in China, most of them members of Taiwanese
Businessmen Association (TBA) in various cities, investing in a range indus-
tries such as manufacturing, biotechnology, furniture, footwear, toys, etc.
The latest fieldwork (2014-2016) concentrated on ICT manufacturers in
China – for instance, manufacturers of panel, of parts and components for
computers or mobile phones, and of semi-conductors – and also a small
percentage of software designers. The locations of the interviews were Tian-
jin, Beijing, Shanghai, Kunshan, Dongguan, and Taipei. The reason for com-
bining three periods of interviews in this paper is to compare Taishangs’
values in different periods, along with their efforts in building or maintaining
relationships with local Chinese officials, in order to answer the core ques-
tion: why and how Taishangs changed their strategies to secure their eco-
nomic interest in China. Three periods of interview data provide a grand
background to Want Want’s emergence, and to be more specific, we also
combine observations from the media about Want Want. The most recent
field trip was funded with the generous support of the Chiang Ching-kuo
Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange as well as the Ministry of
Science and Technology, Taiwan. The structure of this paper is as follows:
the next section introduces a brief theoretical framework, which mainly fo-
cuses on three different approaches to business and government relation-
ships and also more importantly, a particular focus on why media are a
valuable investment for capitalists. The second section documents the his-
tory of Want Want’s investment in China within the bigger picture of Tai-
wanese investment in China. This is followed by discussion and analysis, and
the final section serves as a conclusion. 
The government-business relationship and
the special characteristics of media
investment
Before we start to discuss the government-business relationship, it is im-
portant to note that in the case of Want Want, there are two governments
involved: the Chinese (or Beijing) government and the Taiwanese (or Taipei)
government. (11) We acknowledge that in terms of the Chinese government,
there is empirical evidence that local governments’ interests conflict with
the central government’s. (12) Nevertheless, in this paper we treat the inter-
ests and goals of China’s central and local governments as one. In the fol-
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6. Chin-Hwa Chang, “Analysis of the News Placement and Coverage of Three Chinese Buying Groups
by Taiwan’s Four Main Newspapers from the Perspective of Van Dijk’s Discourse and Manipulation
Theory,” Chinese Journal of Communication Research, No. 20, 2011, pp. 65-93.
7. “Tsai Eng Meng: My Reasons for Buying Media,” Hwa Xia Net, 13 December 2013,
http://big5.huaxia.com/tslj/rdrw/2013/12/3660484_3.html (accessed on 10 May 2016).
8. Ibid.
9. Hsin-Yi Huang, “Pan-Green Legislators Point out the Invasion of Chinese Capital in China Times,”
Apple Daily, 21 May 2010, http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/forum/20100521/
32528299 (accessed on 10 May 2016).
10. Chen-Fang Yu, “Public opinion on independence and unification in Taiwan: Is Taiwan independence
the consensus?,” Who Governs Taiwan Forum, 12 June 2014, http://whogovernstw.org/
2014/06/12/fangyuchen2/ (accessed on 6 March 2017).
11. In this paper, the terms “mainland”/“China” and “Taiwan” are used for the two entities on the two
sides of the Taiwan Strait, for want of any other terms that would be found acceptable by all the
actors involved. “China” refers to the People’s Republic of China (PRC or “the Beijing government”).
“Taiwan” refers to the Republic of China (ROC or “the Taipei government”).
12. Zheng Yongnian, De Facto Federalism in China: Reforms and Dynamics of Central–Local Relations,
Singapore, World Scientific, 2007. 
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lowing theoretical discussion of the government-business relationship, al-
though we mainly focus on Want Want’s interaction with the Chinese gov-
ernment, we also pay attention to Taishangs’ relationships with Taiwanese
lawmakers, for the reason that Taishangs’ relationship with or influence on
the Taiwanese government is seen as being of strategic value to the Chinese
government. This point will be explained in detail through the different pe-
riods of interaction between the Chinese government and Taishangs. 
Coming back to the theoretical discussion of the government-business
relationship, three main approaches are discussed here, namely the soci-
ety-oriented approach, system-oriented approach, and state-centred ap-
proach. (13) We argue that the business-government relationship in Taiwan,
during the period from the 1990s to the present, has been a society-ori-
ented approach, and that the dynamic of Taiwan further strengthened the
business-government relationship in China under the state-centred ap-
proach. The connection between the system-oriented approach and Want
Want’s case is exactly the controversy over defining the capital owner’s na-
tionality in a globalised world. 
Society-oriented approach
The society-oriented approach emphasises business as a powerful interest
group that can constrain government bureaucrats. (14) In order to pursue
their own interests, capitalists endeavour to guide the direction of govern-
ment policy through all possible channels. The core conception of the soci-
ety-oriented approach lies in the “structural dependence” of the state on
capital. There are two main reasons why society-oriented scholars assert
the significant influence of capital owners, especially in organised interest
groups putting pressure on the government. First of all, in a market-oriented
society, the capital holder’s investment provides a living for the majority of
people. They can provide employment opportunities and subsidise govern-
ment expenditure on public infrastructure. As a result, as Lindblom argues,
governments must induce businesses rather than command them. (15) There
is little space for a government to refuse to offer benefits to businesses be-
cause governments need their financial support. 
The second point relates to elections. In a democratic society, political
parties need to be responsive to the electorate. Politicians who expect to
be elected or re-elected need to consider the effects of their policies on
business for the simple reason that these decisions will cause a domino ef-
fect. If the capital owners are dissatisfied with investment policies, they will
withdraw their capital or initiate an investment strike, causing unemploy-
ment and financial instability in society. The society-oriented approach also
emphasises capital owners as important economic and political actors be-
cause politicians rely on private businesses for political support, for instance
donations and votes. Governments have the pressure of facing a trade-off
with capital owners to secure their political continuance. (16) Following the
logic of this argument, it can be suggested that businesses or markets con-
strain the policy-making process. (17)
It can be argued that elections in China don’t have any meaningful impact,
as the Chinese Communist Party still holds on to power under the principle
of so-called “democratic centralism.” (18) As a result, it is possible to argue
that business influence on the Chinese government should be less signifi-
cant than in democratic countries, as the political party (the CCP) doesn’t
need to be responsive to the electorate. However, the society-oriented ap-
proach fits into Taiwanese society, and Taiwanese business’s influence on
Taiwan’s legislative Yuan election is especially apparent in the period from
1994 onwards. The interaction between Taiwanese business and the Tai-
wanese government has transformed Taishangs into a strategic asset for
the Chinese government in the expectation of political reunification. 
System-oriented approach
The system-oriented approach focuses on the growing strength of the
market to constrain a government’s power. (19) Scholars of the system-ori-
ented approach argue that in the global era, national governments compete
for foreign investment. (20) The increasing speed of globalisation accelerates
the pace of capital flight. The growth of technology is the main factor en-
hancing business power under globalisation. (21) Capital holders have more
resources by which to manoeuvre or to choose their preferred investment
environment. The advance of modern technology is one of the key argu-
ments of the system-oriented approach; the removal of capital controls and
the lifting of trade barriers by national governments is the other. The effects
of globalisation can be viewed as limiting what governments can do and
ultimately transforming the state into a weaker actor in the face of multi-
national capital holders. Today national policy makers do not only need to
accommodate business requirements but also need to concern themselves
with relevant policies in other states in order to attract multinational capital
holders. The competition among states has shifted from military equipment
(arms races) to retaining or attracting capital investment within their ter-
ritory. (22) The system-oriented approach is very appealing as a way of ex-
plaining the enormous power of multinational companies (MNCs).
Furthermore, due to technological improvements, the nationality of capital
has become much more complicated and difficult to determine. It is a top-
ical discussion to address the nationality of capital in the globalised world.
It has been argued that, in the globalised world, capital doesn’t have any
specific nationality as the system-oriented scholars argue; however, national
governments do limit capital owners in the following respects: fiscal
regimes, labour and social security, environmental regulation, and finally
the currency exchange rate. (23) This argument might well explain the Want
Want case, and to a larger extent, most Taishang cases. Want Want’s owner,
Mr. Tsai, is of Taiwanese nationality, but his business career developed greatly
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13. G. John Ikenberry, David Lake, and Michael Mastanduno, The State and American Foreign Economic
Policy, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1988.
14. Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World’s Political Economic Systems, New York, Basic
Book Inc., 1977; Adam Przeworski and Michel Wallerstein, “Structure Dependence of the State on
Capital,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 1, 1988, pp. 11–29.
15. Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets, op. cit., p. 173.
16. Adam Przeworski and Michel Wallerstein, “Structure Dependence of the State on Capital,” op. cit.,
p. 13. 
17. Charles E. Lindblom, “The Market as Prison,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 44, No. 2, 1982, p. 327.
18. Michael Waller, Democratic Centralism: A Historical Commentary, Manchester, Manchester Uni-
versity Press, 1981, pp. 91–102. 
19. David M. Andrews, “Capital Mobility and State Autonomy: Toward a Structural Theory of Interna-
tional Monetary Relations,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 2, 1994, pp. 193-218;
Joseph A. Camilleri and James Falk, The End of Sovereignty?, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1992;
Mathew Horsman and Andres Marshall, After the Nation State, London, HarperCollins, 1994.
20. Dennis J. Encarnaion and Louis T. Wells Jr., “Sovereignty en Grade: Negotiating with Foreign In-
vestors,” International Organization, Vol. 39, No. 1, 1985, p. 48; Philip G. Cerny (ed.), Finance and
World Politics: Markets, Regimes and States in the Post-hegemonic Era, Aldershot, Edward Elgar,
1993.
21. Vincent Cable, “The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power,” Daedalus,
Vol. 124, No. 2, 1995, pp. 25-26.
22. Ibid, pp. 23-53.
23. Lorraine Eden, “Taxes, Transfer Pricing, and the Multinational Enterprise,” in Alan M. Rugman and
Thomas L. Brewer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Business, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2001, pp. 591-619.
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in China. The Want Want company as a corporation can be a global brand
(or at least a cross-Strait brand), but how do we define Mr. Tsai’s nationality?
According to the above argument, the capital owner does have de jure na-
tionality due to the realistic constrains of investment, (24) so Mr. Tsai should
not be classified as Taiwanese but rather as a Chinese capital owner.
State-centred approach
Stephen Krasner asserts that the state should be viewed as a main actor
rather than a reflection of societal characteristics or an arena for social
groups to compete. (25) Krasner recognised that the interaction between the
state and social interest groups is dynamic. That is to say, the state may be
strong in some areas but weak in others; the pattern will probably not be
exactly the same in respect to all policy areas. That is, policy decisions are
often made in arenas that respond to narrow social and economic special
interest groups, for instance in relation to agricultural and domestic eco-
nomic policies. (26) In brief, the state-centred approach holds that the state
has the capacity or autonomy to select its own goals, and to interact with
social groups as the means to achieving these selected goals.
In combination with the state-centred approach, we emphasise that in
the case of China, the government-business relationship also reflects the
fact that China is a unique country with distinct characteristics of state
capitalism. (27) The CCP has steered the path of gradual, albeit uneven, inte-
gration within global capitalism, not through coercion but through different
layers of close guanxi (relationship) with business groups. The core reason
that China is characterised as a state capitalist economy is because the
state’s capacity to exert control over the market is omnipresent, and there-
fore business groups have to fulfil the state’s goals or even more, to extend
the state’s goal. This can be seen very clearly in the case of Want Want. In
the Analysis section of this paper, we will particularly analyse two main is-
sues, bearing the framework of state-centred analysis in mind: the rationale
for Want Want’s investment in Taiwanese media, and the popular resistance
to Want Want’s involvement. 
However, before going into a detailed analysis of Want Want’s motivations
for buying into Taiwan’s media, we also want to explain why, among different
kinds of investment, investment in media is an attractive choice to the cap-
italists. The media industry offers economic and socio-political benefits for
media owners. The mass media market has been a major and expanding in-
dustry in the last century. In capitalist society, the media industry can gen-
erate surplus value, i.e., economic benefit. Furthermore, the media industry
is also called the consciousness industry. (28) Its products are full of social im-
plications. In modern society, the media are the primary source of informa-
tion, providing social images and defining social realities of the world. The
media provide an arena where public opinions are expressed, discussed, and
negotiated and where fame and celebrity status are conferred. The media
are also where cultural values are constructed, stored, and expressed. (29)
Because of its social and political importance, the media industry can be
an important asset for its owners for the following two reasons. Firstly, the
media may be used to protect the interests of the owners or the class that
the owners belong to. Numerous studies have shown that mass media tend
to produce messages that reflect the interests of capital or of a particular
class, and protect the interests of the media owners themselves. (30)
Secondly, the owners can use the media to build social ties with politicians
who want to project favourable images through the media in order to in-
fluence public opinion; therefore, they would want to build relationships
with the media owners. Thus, media owners can build ties with powerful
agents and form power blocs. With these social ties, the media owner can
evade laws and regulations. (31) Thus, with the media as important social as-
sets, media owners can protect and advance their interests.
In many countries, media ownership has become increasingly concen-
trated in the hands of the rich and powerful. Over several decades, media
owners have sought to expand their businesses through horizontal and ver-
tical integration, resulting in the formation of national media groups. How-
ever, their growth was largely restricted prior to the 1990s, when national
governments regulated the media industry. With the rise of neoliberal ide-
ology in the 1990s, most national governments adopted deregulation mea-
sures and lowered restrictions on ownership and foreign investment. Thus,
as media ownership became more concentrated, media groups developed
into “media behemoths.” Furthermore, companies outside the media indus-
tries (banks, investment companies, and other large corporate communica-
tion customers), recognising the importance of communication technology,
also entered the media industry through mergers, shareholdings, and inter-
locking directorships. (32) Scholars have criticised the recent deregulation
and the resulting concentration of media ownership. They argue that such
trends serve to reduce the diversity of information provided; consequently,
the public will be poorly informed and will be restricted to a limited range
of media options that protect and advance the media oligopoly’s growing
range of economic and political interests. (33) In responding to those critical
views, we do think Want Want could be a classic case to analyse how the
country’s biggest conglomerate attempted to purchase the country`s major
media outlets in order to expand its political and economic interests.
The growth of Want Want’s investment:
from Taiwan to China
In order to explain Want Want’s emergence as a massive Taiwanese in-
vestor in China, we divide Want Want’s history of investment in China into
four periods. 
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First period: From 1987 to 1993
Want Want started to invest in China in 1991: it belongs to the first gen-
eration of Taiwanese investment in China. Here, we argue that Taiwanese
investment in China started in the early 1980s. (34) However, before the gov-
ernment of Taiwan lifted martial law in 1987, business people were com-
pletely prohibited from investing in China. After lifting martial law, the
Taiwanese government gradually relaxed the controls on investment in
China. (35) The financial contribution of Taiwanese investment was the main
concern for both central and local Chinese governments in this first period,
and this is reflected in the interaction between Taiwanese investors and
local governments. 
Want Want was a medium-sized food company in Taiwan in the 1980s.
The owner of the company, Mr. Tsai Eng-Meng, decided to invest in China
when the country started on a path of market reform and invited foreign
investment. Tsai visited China in 1991 and invested in Hunan the next year.
He was attracted by the warm welcome from the local Chinese government.
The flexibility of the Chinese government towards Taiwanese business is re-
flected in the following examples. First of all, in the early 1990s, in the Spe-
cial Economic Zones (SEZs) in Guangdong, Taishangs enjoyed preferential
benefits relative to other foreign investors. Those benefits included better
locations for factories. As one Taiwanese businessman recalls: 
When we came to this small place [one county in Dongguan] in the
early 1990s, there was no decent road with asphalt, only fields of
rice. The Party secretary of Dongguan promised to build a broad
boulevard for transportation. In half a year’s time the road was built,
directly from our factory to the nearest port. (36)
Another example is land rent, which most local Chinese governments can
waive for ten years in the case of Taishangs, whereas foreign investors only
have a six-year rent holiday. The situation is similar in terms of tax breaks:
Taishangs can enjoy a tax break for six to ten years, whereas most foreign
investors only enjoy two years tax-free, with tax deductions at half the usual
rate for another three years. (37)
This is similar to the situation of Tsai’s investment in China during that
period, but Tsai did not choose the coastal area where most Taishangs
gathered. He decided to invest in Hunan Province in central China, south
of the Yangtze River, mainly because the incentives provided by the local
government were even better than in the coastal cities. According to Tsai,
Hunan officials were very eager to cater to foreign investors and promised
to meet all the demands of Want Want. They promised to build special
electrical and transportation networks, to provide particular tax reductions
and particular incentives for high-tech industries. Furthermore, the offi-
cials also provided administrative conveniences. (38) In exchange, Tsai
promised to invest US$10 million in Hunan and bring job opportunities
to the region. Tsai recalled that the major officials of the Party, the gov-
ernment, and the military at the provincial level showed up at the signing
ceremony, as it was the biggest investment in Hunan up to then. (39) Nev-
ertheless, in this early period, we argue that both government (the local
Hunan government) and business (Want Want) remained focused on
purely economic interests. For the Hunan government, Want Want repre-
sented a huge amount of investment that would boost local economic
development, so the government was very willing to provide practical
support to meet the company’s demands. Even for the central Chinese
government, although they designed the regulations that stipulated that
Taiwanese investors were entitled to more benefits than other foreign in-
vestors, (40) they were mainly focused on attracting Taiwanese capital
rather than using Taiwanese investors to accomplish the political goal of
reunification in this period.
Second period: From 1994 to 2000
Want Want had a good start in Hunan. It shipped machines and staff from
abroad, and earned US$20 million in the first year, more than the revenues
earned in Taiwan, and $40 million in the second year. As a result of the social
connections they had made with local leaders, Want Want was given more
favours by the Hunan government; for example, building infrastructure
(water, transportation, and communications) for Want Want and providing
Want Want with tax reductions – favourable conditions that were originally
designed for export–oriented high-technology industries, but were applied
to Want Want. (41)
The reason why the central and local Chinese government kept offering
Taiwanese investors special flexibility was largely due to the fact that, since
the early 1990s, Taiwanese investors had been able to cultivate close rela-
tionships with Taiwanese legislators. With the help of financial donations
by Taishangs to legislators during election campaigns and during legislative
terms, legislative restrictions were eased by legislators under the influence
of actors (Taishangs) notorious for favoring less strict conditions for invest-
ment in China. One obvious case is the authorisation of the “three small di-
rect links” between China and the Taiwan-controlled Kinmen & Mazu
islands. Businessmen started to lobby as soon as Chen’s presidency began
in 2000, and legislation was swiftly passed early the following year. The
same has happened with policy-making. Tse-Kang Leng shows how big Tai-
wanese business groups already influenced Taiwan’s public policy under the
presidency of Lee Teng-hui, with the example of the private airline com-
pagny EVA:
In early 1994, Chang [president of EVA airline] began to urge the go-
vernment to lift the ban on direct transportation across the Straits.
In June, the MOEA’s Investment Commission approved a US$6 mil-
lion plan by the Evergreen Group to build a container depot in Shan-
ghai. (42)
Naturally mainland policy became the most popular interpellation topic
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in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan in the early 1990s. For instance, one Taiwanese
investor in Tianjin expressed the view, “The Tianjin government runs a ‘Chi-
nese Investment Research Seminar’ monthly, and most students of this
seminar are Taiwanese legislators.” (43) Not only keen on attending these
short-term courses organised by the Chinese government, Taiwanese legis-
lators were also keen to study for a degree from a reputed Chinese univer-
sity during this period of time. (44) The Chinese government therefore
perceived the possibility of influencing Taiwanese lawmakers by wooing Tai-
wanese investors. According to Tse-Kang Leng, although these legislators do
not have the actual power to promulgate new laws, they certainly have ef-
fective power to lobby the executive branches. (45) Suffice it to say that the
results of these lobbying efforts are unpredictable: it depends on the fluc-
tuating cross-Strait relationship and the businessmen-legislators’ financial
power. (46) However, more and more Taiwanese investors in China can be
seen as having close links with Taiwanese lawmakers, and this certainly at-
tracted the central Chinese government’s attention. Winning over the hearts
and minds of Taiwanese investors therefore became a practical strategy to
increase the central Chinese government’s influence on Taipei’s mainland
policy. 
Apart from Taishangs’ increasing political power in the Legislative Yuan in
Taipei, Taiwanese investors gradually became important envoys across the
Strait. Furthermore, the semi-official channels Strait Exchange Foundation
(SEF) and Association for Relations Across Taiwan Strait (ARATS) ceased in-
teraction after 1999. Then-President Lee Teng-hui’s “Two States Theory” in
July 1999 contended that Taiwan is a sovereign country and that its inter-
national identity should be equal to that of the PRC. This assertion com-
pletely negated the “One China Principle.” (47) The major consequence of
Lee’s assertion was the indefinite postponement of official talks across the
Strait and of a visit to Taiwan by Wang Daohan’s (then chairman of ARATS).
The possibility of creating a formal negotiation channel across the Strait
accordingly came to an end after the two bodies ceased their contact. In
light of the declining interaction between the SEF and ARATS after 1999,
both governments placed more value on the existing, but informal, channel
of Taishangs as their bridge across the Strait. The Deputy Chairman of
ARATS, Tang Shubei, stated explicitly in 2000 that the Chinese central gov-
ernment relied more on Taishangs as their bridge to the government in
Taipei since negotiations could not be conducted via official channels. (48)
Secondly, the Taipei government could hardly ignore the voice of Tai-
wanese businesses. Taiwanese investors after 2000 increasingly influenced
the Taipei government’s mainland policy, not only at the legislative level
but also at the policy-making level. Taiwan is in the process of consoli-
dating democracy; therefore, government leaders rely more on the support
of businesses both in running for election and in financing the govern-
ment. In other words, the government–business relationship in Taiwan
gradually transformed into government dependence on business people’s
demands. As we argued in our theoretical framework from a society-ori-
ented business-government relation’s perspective, governments have the
pressure of facing a trade-off with capital owners to secure their political
continuance. (49) This is the reason why during this period, the influence
of Taishangs on Taipei’s mainland policy was greater than in the previous
period from 1994 to 1999. Both the KMT and the DPP needed business
support to run or sustain their presidency. The battles between the KMT
and the DPP to win the support of Taishangs can be seen in the following
example, whereby both party leaders promised a more open Mainland
policy before the presidential election. After announcing his decision to
stand as the KMT candidate for the 2008 presidential election, Ma Ying-
jeou met with Taiwanese investors and promised to offer a more open
Mainland Policy under the banner of protecting Taiwan’s economic secu-
rity. (50) On the same day, the DPP also held a tea party for Taiwanese in-
vestors and reported on the progress of Taipei’s Mainland policy from 2004
to the present. (51)
Although there is no specific evidence to prove that Want Want built con-
tacts with Taiwanese legislators during this period, the reason we detail Tai-
shangs’ emerging political importance in this period is to demonstrate why
the Chinese government would view Taiwanese businesses as agents to
achieve their political goals. Want Want, as we emphasise, is the extreme
case of Taishangs being an agent for the Chinese government to achieve
such goals. 
Third period: From 2001 to 2008
In connection with the previous period, from 2001 to 2008, the central
government kept encouraging local governments to offer special flexibility
towards Taiwanese investors. (52) In order to enter the World Trade Organi-
sation (WTO) in 2001, the Chinese government should apply equivalent
regulations to all non-Chinese investors. China officially declared that all
preferential tax regulations for foreign investors, including Taiwanese in-
vestors, would be decreased in stages from 2000. (53) In order to become a
permanent member of the WTO, China was obliged to offer all WTO mem-
bers equal trading privileges. This commitment to the WTO means that
China cannot grant special privileges to any specific investors, including Tai-
wanese investors. Nevertheless, as we mentioned in the previous period,
with the rapidly increasing Taiwanese investment and Taishangs’ influence
on Taiwan’s domestic politics, the central Chinese government became in-
creasingly aware that close economic ties across the Strait gave the Chinese
government more strength in the cross-Strait relationship. According to
Shen Kunrong, director of the cross-Strait Economic Development Research
Centre of China’s Nanjing University: 
Taiwanese investment provided a richer and more solid foundation
for the implementation of Beijing’s policy on cross-Strait reunifica-
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tion than military strength. If cross-Strait economic relations keep
growing, it will put pressure on the Taipei government to take a pro-
Beijing position in their mainland policy. (54)
Taiwanese investors consequently became more important in the sense
of bearing the responsibility for reunification in the central government’s
considerations. 
The importance of Taishangs can be illustrated by the case of Want Want.
In 2002 Want Want gained permission to enter other businesses, including
insurance, hospitals, and restaurants, and as a result, Want Want became a
conglomerate at the provincial level. Based on the Hunan model, Want
Want built factories in different regions on the mainland beyond Hunan, as
Tsai considered in 1994 that “the Chinese market is so vast and bound-
less.” (55) While other provincial governments were eager to attract foreign
investment, Want Want chose those provinces that provided favourable
conditions, such as cheap land and buildings. In the following 13 years, Want
Want established more than 100 factories and distribution networks in dif-
ferent regions of China. (56) By making the most of the vast market, Want
Want made big profits.
In line with the greater importance of Taiwanese businesses in China for
both the central and local Chinese governments, by 2004 Want Want was
deeply rooted in China, from production to consumption. First, Want Want
built factories and branches in most provinces of the mainland. Second,
Want Want adopted machines made in China, used its raw materials (e.g.,
rice), and employed Chinese workers in order to cut the cost of production
and compete with emerging competitors. (57) Third, most of Want Want’s
market was in China, and most of its revenues were generated from
China. (58) Fourthly, Want Want developed new products for different sectors
and regions of the Chinese market. (59) Lastly, Want Want moved its head-
quarters to Shanghai: the Yilan company in Taiwan was now merely a branch
of the China Want Want group. 
Fourth period: From 2008 to 2016
In this period, dramatic change occurred not only in the cross-Strait rela-
tionship but also in the global economic structure. There are several issues
worth discussing in this context, of which the most crucial include compe-
tition with emerging local enterprises, dealing with labour issues, facing
global economic recession, and finally, the KMT’s return to power in Taiwan.
These changes directly affected Taishangs’ interaction with local officials.
Most of them state that their position of “privilege” significantly declined
during this period. Although Taiwanese investment is still important for local
governments, Taiwanese businesses no longer seem to have such easy ac-
cess to local officials. (60) According to one Taiwanese investors in Kunshan: 
In the past, we could call the mayor directly on his mobile, even at
midnight. Now if we wanted to see the mayor we needed to wait
for his secretary to arrange an appointment. Sometimes we had to
wait for weeks. (61)
In the first period discussed above, many Taiwanese businesses enjoyed
benefits from local governments, for instance tax rebates and low-cost land
rental. However, after 15 years, most tax privileges were suspended. There-
fore, from 2008 onwards, most Taiwanese businesses had already enjoyed
this tax break. As for the land rental, at the beginning, in order to attract as
much Taiwanese investment as possible, most local officials agreed to offer
Taiwanese businesses extremely cheap rents. Nevertheless, their promises
were unreliable, since there were no written documents or formal policies.
Under these circumstances, Taiwanese businesses have had to compete not
only with other foreign investors but also with domestic investors on an
equal basis. Most Taishangs remark that in competition with other foreign
investors, they might gain some trifling benefits because of their shared
language and culture, but in competition with domestic enterprises, Tai-
wanese businesses don’t enjoy any advantages. (62)
After the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Employment Contracts
(hereafter referred to as the new labour law) came into effect on 1 January
2008, many employers in China started to panic about their human resource
expenditure, because this new labour law provided detailed protection for
labour. (63) For Taiwanese businesses, this was the worst possible timing. In
2008, the implementation of the new labour law meant that most Tai-
wanese SMEs that were benefiting from cheap labour now faced a rather
challenging situation.
The KMT came back into power: for most Taiwanese businessmen in China,
this was not necessarily a good thing. As Lee points out, the strategic value
of Taishangs during the DPP era was far more important than in the KMT
era, because Taishangs served as political agents across the Strait under
Chen Shui-bian’s government, but not under Ma Ying-jeou. (64)
All these changes applied to the particular case of the Want Want group’s
investment in China. Rightly, given all the harsh circumstances faced by Tai-
wanese investors after 2009, Want Want developed new practices. It began
to purchase media, first in Hong Kong and then in Taiwan. This investment
in the media business was different from the previous investment that Want
Want had been involved in. First, in the past, Want Want had not invested
in the risky media businesses; especially in 2008, the profitability and
prospects of the media business were uncertain, if not gloomy. Second,
Want Want had stayed in the mainland because of the low cost of produc-
tion, but costs in the media business were high. Third, in the past, Tsai had
not openly talked about politics, but now he did talk about politics, claiming
that he had invested in Taiwan’s media industry in order to strengthen the
cross-Strait relationship. According to Tsai, when the pro-China KMT candi-
date Ma Ying-jeou won the presidency in 2008 and ended the pro-indepen-
dence DPP’s rule, Tsai anticipated that cooperation between the two sides
of the Strait would be enhanced. He agreed with Ma’s mainland policy and
decided to come back to Taiwan and to enhance the understanding of Tai-
wanese people about mainland China. (65) After buying the Want Want media
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group, Tsai has continued to hold cross-Strait semi-official forums, inviting
high-ranking officials and leading business figures from Chinese provinces
and Taiwan. For example, Tsai established a new title – Want Daily. This
paper, together with the Shanghai City government, has held annual fo-
rums (66) to establish links between the business hubs of China and cities in
Taiwan. In the forums, Taiwanese mayors were invited, the Shanghai mayor
expressed his anticipation of cross-Strait communication, and the publisher
Tsai, admiring the rise of China as an economic superpower, testified that
he had witnessed the success of China’s economic reform. (67)
Analysis
Want Want’s rationale for investing in Taiwanese
media: Buying the media as a social asset for
building political ties 
Arguably, Want Want invested in the media business mainly to build ties
with CCP officials in the central government and to extend its business in
China. As we argued in our theoretical section, China’s economic system is
state capitalist; that is, the party-state controls the flow of capital but also
allocates resources to the private sector. (68) In 2006, Want Want was expand-
ing as an international conglomerate and would need the support of the
CCP. For example, in 2006 Want Want was listed on the Hong Kong stock
market; part of its stocks were bought by the state banks of China and pro-
CCP conglomerates, including Hong Kong’s richest businessman, Li Ka-shing.
Want Want entered the media business when the CCP launched its “Grand
Overseas Propaganda” Campaign. After the 2008 Olympic torch protest,
the CCP actively co-opted Chinese capitalists to acquire media corporations
in Europe and the United States. (69) In this context, Want Want bought half
the shares in Asia TV in Hong Kong in 2009. Want Want purchased the China
Times Media Group (which consists of China Times and Commercial Times,
and many magazine titles, a terrestrial TV station, China Television Co., and
a cable news channel, CTiTV) just before the anti-Communist Apple Daily
made an offer to buy the China Times Group. 
Arguably, Want Want acquired the China Times group to accumulate social
and economic capital in order to expand its business in China. The Want
Want group owner voluntarily provided ideological services for the CCP. Tsai
openly displayed his support for Beijing. He told the Washington Post in an
interview that the crackdown on 4 June was “no massacre.” (70) The media
under the Want Want group further carried out “product placement” pro-
jects for Beijing; that is, the Want Want group received fees from the Chinese
government and allocated the fees to other Taiwanese media to publicise
stories favourable to China. (71)
Providing ideological services for Beijing, the Want Want media group
waged wars against Taiwanese citizen groups, thus violating the social and
economic principles of the media. Because the China Times Media Group
consisted of different media outlets, media reform groups and some media
academics were concerned about Want Want’s control of Taiwan’s media;
they demanded that regulators should not approve the acquisition easily. (72)
The Want Want group did not make any promises to Taiwanese society, for
example on protecting press freedom and respecting professionalism. In-
stead, it filed lawsuits against citizen groups, reporters, and college profes-
sors it deemed hostile. Want Want’s attack on its opponents triggered more
resistance, as 149 scholars signed a petition to demand that Want Want
stop the lawsuits and respect media professionalism. (73)
While losing social support in Taiwan, Want Want’s owner strengthened
his ties with high-ranking officials and gained social status in China. First,
according to an article in Common Wealth, Want Want’s owner gave a brief-
ing to the head of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office about buying Taiwan’s media.
The Chinese official promised to assist Want Want in doing business in
China. (74)
Second, Want Want could mobilise its own media to provide positive im-
ages to Chinese officials. The media in the China Times group often offered
positive images of China and different provinces of China. When officials
visited Taiwan and met important people in Taiwan, they would visit Tsai at
the China Times group, hoping that he would offer positive images to them. 
Third, Want Want’s owners became an important channel (or agents) be-
tween the powerful elites of the two countries. The China Times group, to-
gether with various Chinese local governments, hosted cross-Strait forums
to discuss economic cooperation between Taiwan and China. In these fo-
rums, high-ranking Chinese officials would be presented; Want Want chose
which Taiwanese politicians and business figures to invite to these important
occasions. (75)
Fourth, in 2011, the Want Want group and other state enterprises received
support from the Chinese government. According to a study by Fathom
China, in 2013, out of 50 prominent private-sector Chinese firms, 45 re-
ceived subsidies; Want Want was sixth on the list, receiving US$11 million
from the Chinese government, which was about 11% of its net profit. (76)
Finally, the owner of Want Want gained social influence in China. In 2012,
Tsai was nominated one of China’s most prominent figures in the economic
field by China Central Television (CCTV). Only twenty Chinese were nomi-
nated; Want Want group owner Tsai was on that VIP list. (77)
These five factors identified the case of Want Want as one of mastering
media as a strategic asset to gain rewards from the Chinese government in
the form of facilitating its business in China. In the framework of the state-
centred approach, Want Want fully complied with the Chinese government’s
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demands. Furthermore, Want Want does not just want to be granted eco-
nomic benefits for its business in China. As our evidence indicates, it also seeks
to be an influential Taiwanese business across the Strait, a strategically im-
portant goal for Want Want because the model of state capitalism in China
can open more possibilities for Want Want’s expansion in China. For the Chi-
nese government, Want Want became an eager agent. Through the Want
Want media platforms, the Chinese government met not only Taiwanese busi-
nessmen but also Taiwanese officials. It was a “win-win” situation for both the
Chinese government and the Want Want group. The cost of this victory, re-
sistance from Taiwanese society, is what we will discuss in the next section. 
The cost of Want Want’s strategy: Local resistance
To gain more influence in Taiwan’s media industry, in autumn 2011, Want
Want proposed to buy Taiwan’s second largest MSO. MSOs were very im-
portant in Taiwan’s media landscape. First, cable television was dominant in
Taiwan, as 70% of households subscribed to cable television. Second, cable
operators could decide which channels were shown and their positions on
the platform. Third, cable systems were concentrated in four major MSOs;
among them, China Network System Co. controlled 20% of cable subscribers.
Thus, Want Want attempted to buy this MSO from a foreign investment
company, MBK Partners Ltd., at a cost of US$ 2.4 billion, the highest media
merger fee in Asia. (78) The Want Want group claimed that the merger would
boost Taiwan’s media industry and recover it from foreign hands.
However, because Want Want had utilised the media to please Chinese
officials and to attack its opponents, some academics opposed the merger.
There were three arguments against it. First, it would bring about a media
monopoly and affect pluralism. The opponents argued that Want Want al-
ready owned the China Times Group, including several media outlets – two
newspapers, several magazine titles, TV channels, and a terrestrial TV station;
with the MSO, Want Want would interfere with other media outlets with
its power to decide which channels could be broadcast via cable. Second,
the applicant, Want Want, was not “fit and proper” as a television licence
holder. The opponents reviewed the performance of the Want Want China
Times Group over the past year and listed several actions taken by the group
that they said were either illegal or unprofessional. In particular, Want Want
had conducted product placement operations for the CCP; this practice was
illegal. (79) Third, there was the “China factor.” Some scholars coined the term
“China factor” to describe the way the rich and powerful in the cross-Strait
relationship began to make alliances and to influence Taiwan’s democracy
and press freedom. (80)
It can be argued that this opposition was triggered by the Want Want
group, as Want Want did not follow the usual principles of Taiwanese society.
The reason we argue that the Want Want group is right not to take too
much notice of Taiwanese society is because the Taiwanese government is
not the one that Want Want as a business group will gain profit or benefit
from. As we discussed under government-business relationships, we assert
that the state-centred approach is more relevant to explaining our example.
Here we would like to emphasise that the business group submits to the
government’s demands because of economic benefits that the business
needed from that very government. Therefore, for the Want Want group,
the Chinese government was the one that would grant them such benefits,
not the Taiwanese government. This is the reason why the Want Want group
presented the Chinese government with such a strategic asset: media in-
fluence over Taiwanese society. In an earlier merger, the Fubon telecommu-
nications group had proposed to acquire the biggest MSO; on this occasion
only a few media scholars had pointed out the danger of media monopoly.
However, in the Want Want case, as Want Want did not care about the so-
cial and economic principles of Taiwanese society, but used its media to
support the Chinese government and to attack its opponents at home,
scholars from different disciplines (economics, law, sociology, telecommu-
nications, and so on) mobilised against the merger. For example, scholars
co-signed a statement entitled “Watch out, a media monster is threatening”
in protest against the merger, demanding that the National Communica-
tions Commission (NCC) should set up a special committee to review the
case carefully. (81) Later, more than 3,000 citizens signed. (82) Further, some
prominent intellectuals launched a boycott against Want Want media by
giving up writing columns for the China Times. At this stage, the intellectual
community was mobilised against Want Want’s merger.
Want Want continued to test the limits of Taiwanese society when regula-
tors (the NCC) ruled on the merger. Based on a previous case, on 25 July 2012,
the NCC ruled that there must be separation between the MSO and the news
channel. (83) Both Want Want and its opponents were upset about the ruling.
Want Want expected to pass unconditionally and to be allowed to control
both the MSO and the news channel. The opposition demanded that the NCC
reject the proposal. On the day of the ruling, several college professors sub-
mitted a petition to the NCC, urging the media regulator to reject the deal.
About 200 students later appeared to protest against the merger. Two publi-
cations under the Want Want China Times Group showed pictures of the stu-
dents allegedly receiving cash from an anonymous woman. (84) The stories
then implied that one of the professors, Dr. Huang, had mobilised the students
for the protest. Huang said he did not know that a group of students would
show up after he left the premises. (85) When one National Tsing Hua University
student, Chen Wei-ting, questioned Want Want’s motives, he also became a
target of criticism by media outlets under the group. 
Because Want Want had fabricated stories to attack its opponents, young
people began to realise that the media owner could openly use its media
outlets as tools to attack his enemies. On 31 July 2012, hundreds of stu-
dents, organised by “Youth Alliance Against the Media Monster,” gathered
in front of the television station of the China Times group, protesting against
the Want Want Group and accusing it of violating professional journalistic
values and damaging Taiwan’s democracy and freedom. They demanded
that the Want Want group abandon the merger. (86)
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This movement reached a peak on 1 September 2012, as tens of thou-
sands of journalists, students, academics, and social activists took to the
streets of Taipei to protest against media monopolisation. Their main de-
mands included protecting media professionalism, an apology from the
Want Want China Times Group, supervision by the NCC, and ending media
monopolies. (87) The participants made the following main points: first, they
pointed out that untrammelled media moguls would threaten freedom of
speech in Taiwan. Second, they demanded that the NCC take legal measures
to protect media professionalism. Third, they observed that the so-called
“China factor” was not only an academic term but effective in real life, in-
fluencing Taiwan’s democracy, and they demanded that “the Chinese should
get their dirty hands off media and journalism in Taiwan.” (88)
However, Want Want did not accept the demands of the civil society
groups and demonstrators; because Want Want’s main interests have been
on the Chinese mainland, Want Want wanted to build ties with Chinese of-
ficials, not with Taiwanese civil society groups. The demonstrators demanded
that the Want Want group stop buying Taiwanese media, but Tsai Eng-Meng
said he would continue to buy more and even bigger Taiwanese media, (89)
and Want Want later made an offer to buy its competing newspaper, Apple
Daily. Moreover, the demonstrators demanded that the Want Want media
group should foster journalistic professionalism by establishing democratic
decision-making mechanisms in the newsroom, but the Want Want group
totally ignored this demand.
The Want Want group was clearly either unwilling or unable to enter into
real dialogue with Taiwanese civil society groups. 
Conclusion
Since 2008, a new type of media investor has emerged in Taiwan. The Tai-
wanese businessman, Want Want’s owner, who made a fortune in China, re-
turned to Taiwan after 2008 and tried to influence Taiwan’s media and
politics. The Want Want group is different from previous Taishangs, who
mainly focused on their own businesses, seldom returned to Taiwan, and re-
mained apolitical. Want Want not only returned to Taiwan, but also tried to
use the media as a mouthpiece of the Chinese government, even at the
cost of losing the Taiwanese market and the confidence of the Taiwanese
people. This paper set out to analyse the rise and the rationale of this new
type of media investor.
We have tried to answer this question in the light of the business-gov-
ernment relationship, regarding the Chinese state as a major player in this
context. We mainly adopted the state-centred approach and argued that
China has distinct characteristics of state capitalism; that is, the CCP’s path
toward capitalism has been paved with different layers of relationships
closely linked with business groups. We have also explained how capitalists
could use the media as an important social asset to build ties with politi-
cians who want to gain publicity, favourable images, and influence. These
social ties can create economic benefits, particularly under Chinese state
capitalism.
We have also analysed the development of Want Want in the context of
Taiwanese investment in China. As we have shown, right after the Tianan-
men Square Event of 4 June 1989, some foreign investors left China, and
Chinese local governments were beckoning Taiwanese businessmen with
many incentives to attract them. In the early 1990s, Want Want grasped
this opportunity, building factories and retail outlets across many provinces,
and developing various types of content for different sectors of the Chinese
market. Yet, as the private sector has developed in China since 2000, the
Chinese government has had to pay more attention to Chinese business-
people. In addition to this, following China’s admission to the WTO, offering
special incentives to Taiwanese businesses has become more complicated
due to WTO regulations. Thus, Taishangs have had to build ties with Party
and government officials. In this context, to seek further expansion in China,
Want Want has had to build social ties with Chinese officials.
As we have shown, to achieve this, Want Want invested in Taiwanese
media as a social asset in order to build political ties on the Chinese main-
land. In most cases, media tycoons use the media of a country to build so-
cial ties with politicians of that country. What is extraordinary in this case
is that, in the special context of cross-Strait relations whereby the PRC has
attempted to control the ROC (Taiwan), Want Want bought media concerns
in Taiwan as an important social asset in order to build social ties in China
and to expand its business in the Chinese mainland, even at the cost of los-
ing markets, trust, and confidence in Taiwan. As we have seen, in doing so,
Want Want also triggered resistance from Taiwanese civil society, which ul-
timately resulted in the failure of the merger case.
We have to reconsider the nature of this new sort of media investment,
particularly as, following in Want Want’s footsteps, other big Taiwanese busi-
nesses in China have also attempted to buy Taiwanese media companies.
For example, Ting Hsin International Group made an offer on the same MSO
(China Network System Co.). Also, HTC, a mobile phone manufacturer based
in China, purchased all the shares of a major channel group, TVBS (which
consists of TVBS Entertainment Channel, TVBS News, and TVBS Asia). Be-
cause of the political economy of the region, this type of media investment
will continue to exist, using the media as assets to build social ties and to
multiply economic benefit. Thus, we need to consider the nature of the in-
vestment: is it considered Taiwanese capital or Red capital, or a special type
that is based in country A, although the owner’s nationality is of country
B? This is not merely a conceptual issue, but also a regulatory issue.
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